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Can information systems (IS) auditors ignore
irrelevant information when they assess key
risk factors (KRFs)? Irrelevant information
is information that is of little or no value to
a specific task or predicted future outcome.1
When assessing a KRF, IS auditors sift through
numerous pieces of information to target items
that are relevant to understanding the KRF.2
Some items encountered by IS auditors may be
relevant to understanding the KRF, while other
items encountered may be irrelevant. IS auditors
should ignore irrelevant information when they
assess KRFs.
An example of irrelevant information that
an IS auditor may encounter during a financial
statement audit is obsolete code that was written
for an application that was replaced in a previous
audit period—the data that were saved in the
prior application have been saved in the new
application. Although IS auditors are aware
that the old code is irrelevant, the old code may
still influence IS auditors’ KRF assessments.
Irrelevant information may influence IS auditors
to reduce their assessments of KRFs when higher
assessments would be more appropriate. If IS
auditors were exposed to irrelevant information
during a financial statement audit and decreased
their assessment of KRFs, too few resources
may be allocated toward gaining a better
understanding of the KRFs. As a result, audit
failure3 could occur.
Thirty-seven IS auditors participated in a
repeated-trial experiment in which they all
read the same case and responded to the same
questions about a multinational, publicly
traded bank that provided e-banking services.
During the experiment, the participants rated
the effectiveness of e-banking KRFs, estimated
the risk of material misstatement for e-banking
KRFs and suggested revisions to the audit plan
for e-banking services KRFs. The participants
also completed a knowledge test and provided
information about their backgrounds.

The change in the IS auditors’ KRF
assessments when irrelevant information is
present vs. when the irrelevant information is
not present is the dependent variable in this
study. The results of this study reveal that IS
auditors’ KRF assessments are significantly
lower when irrelevant information is present vs.
when irrelevant information is not present. This
study also presents evidence that knowledge of
automated controls can help mitigate the effects
of irrelevant information on IS auditors’ KRF
assessments.
HYPOTHESES
Individuals have been found to lower their
predictions of future event outcomes when
they are exposed to irrelevant information.
The literature that describes this phenomenon
explains that individuals dilute their predictions
by unintentionally overlapping characteristics of
irrelevant information with relevant information
characteristics.4 While individuals attend to
and unintentionally overlap the characteristics
of irrelevant and relevant information, they
eventually become distracted by the saliency
of the irrelevant information. The result is the
failure of individuals to focus their attention
exclusively on information that is relevant to the
task. The unintentional deemphasis of relevant
information causes the individuals to reduce their
predictions of future event outcomes. Thus, it
is predicted that IS auditors will provide lower
KRF predictions when irrelevant information is
present. The hypotheses, stated in the alternative
form, are:
• Hypothesis 1: Irrelevant information
will influence IS auditors to reduce their
effectiveness ratings of e-banking KRFs.
• Hypothesis 2: Irrelevant information will
influence IS auditors to reduce their likelihood
estimates of the risk of material misstatement
for e-banking KRFs.
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• Hypothesis 3: Irrelevant information will influence IS
auditors to reduce their audit plan revisions relative to the
prior year’s audit.
RESEARCH METHOD
This section details the research method for the experiment.
Pretesting
The KRFs and irrelevant information in this experiment were
developed with the assistance of two Certified Information
Systems Auditors (CISAs) who were senior assurance
managers with two separate Big Four accounting firms. The
two CISAs provided feedback that was used to revise the
wording of the KRFs and irrelevant information items.
To distinguish the KRFs from the irrelevant information
items in this experiment, the KRFs and irrelevant information
items underwent a second round of pretesting with four
seasoned IS auditors.5 The IS auditors in the second round
of pretesting had an average of 64.75 months of experience
as IS auditors and had worked on an average of 22.75 client
engagements. The pretest group had an average of 15 more
months of experience than the average experimental participant.
The pretest IS auditors rated the relevance of each KRF
and each piece of irrelevant information individually (1 [low
relevance] to 100 [high relevance]). Pretest results revealed that
the pretest IS auditors’ average pretest relevance rating for the
KRFs was 85 and their average pretest relevance rating for the
irrelevant information items was 11.23. The pretest IS auditors
distinguished the KRFs from the irrelevant pieces of information
by rating the KRFs to be seven times more relevant than the
irrelevant information items used in this study.
Experimental Participants
The emphasis of this study was to identify how IS auditors
are influenced by irrelevant information when they assess
KRFs. The merits of this study were discussed with senior
management at international accounting firms during the
2
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study’s proposal stage. The members of senior management
at the international accounting firms were interested in
the results of the study, and because of their interest, they
agreed to allow their IS auditors to volunteer and participate
in this study. The IS auditors who participated in this
study volunteered of their own will, were not selected by
the researcher based on any selective criteria and were not
forced to participate by their employing firms. Thus, the
backgrounds of the IS auditors in this study may be similar to
the backgrounds possessed by the population of IS auditors
who assess KRFs.
Thirty-seven IS auditors participated in this study.
Descriptive data on the participants in the study are provided
in figure 1.

Figure 1—Participant Demographics
Mean
(Standard
Deviation)
N = 37
Average months of experience

49.43
(39.66)

Average number of engagements

20.76
(26.82)

Average number of IS training courses taken as a
professional

7.92
(8.14)

Average number of IS training courses taken while
pursuing an undergraduate degree

2.95
(3.64)

Case Material
Participants’ KRF predictions were captured using a computer
program that was designed by the researcher according to
the Tailored Design Method.6 The program controlled effects
by randomizing the presentation order of the information
pieces. The program also controlled the order in which the
participants completed the tasks in the experiment. The
program saved participants’ responses when they chose to
proceed to the next page, and it did not allow participants
to modify their saved responses on a page once they moved
to the next page. Participants were not subject to any time
pressure and took an average of 38.15 minutes to complete
the tasks.
Participants were informed of the experiment by their
respective employing firms and given the option to volunteer.
Before participants were granted access to the computer

program, they read an overview that summarized the purpose
of the study. The participants were then given the option
to continue (97 percent of the participants continued and
completed the study). Those who chose to continue were
then assigned a password and a personal identification
number (PIN). Participants used their passwords to enter
the experiment, and after reading the general instructions,
the participants entered their PINs and provided their formal
consent to participate in the study. Half of the participants
were randomly assigned to the automated-control KRF
initially and then to the manual-process KRF. The other half
of the participants were assigned to the manual-process KRF
initially and then to the automated-control KRF.
The design of the experiment is a repeated trial in
which each participant is exposed to every experimental
condition (or phase) in the study. In the first trial of this
experiment, each participant assessed effectiveness, risk
material misstatement and audit plan adjustments with
irrelevant information. For the next trial, the irrelevant
information was removed from the experimental condition.
This design exposed the effects of the irrelevant information
on IS auditors’ KRF assessments and allowed for the direct
measurement of the influence of irrelevant information.
An automated-control KRF was evaluated in two phases
of the experiment. A manual-process KRF was also evaluated,
but in two different phases of the experiment. In phases one
and two, participants were given four irrelevant items and one
KRF for automated-control items (or manual-process items,
depending on the participant group). During phase one,
participants were asked to provide their KRF predictions after
reading four irrelevant automated-control items (or manualprocess items) with the automated-control KRF (or manualprocess KRF). During phase two, participants were asked to
provide their KRF predictions based solely on the automatedcontrol KRF (or manual-process KRF). Participants then
repeated these steps during phases three and four for manualprocess KRFs (or automated-control KRFs).
Three dependent variables were captured and tested
for each phase of the experiment. Participants rated the
effectiveness of e-banking KRFs using a seven-point Likert
scale, -3 (extremely effective) to +3 (extremely ineffective).
Participants predicted the risk of material misstatement7
for e-banking KRFs by estimating likelihood probabilities
between 0 and 100. Participants rated the audit plan revisions

relative to the prior year’s audit using an 11-point Likert
scale, 0 (significantly decrease) to 10 (significantly increase).
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
Figure 2 provides the statistics for the automated-control
e-banking KRF (panel A) and the manual-process e-banking
KRF (panel B). The means and standard deviations—with
irrelevant information and without irrelevant information—
are provided for both panels. The result of each risk
prediction is discussed following the figure.
As shown in panel A, the mean response and the standard
deviation of the participants’ ratings of the effectiveness
of the automated-control e-banking KRF with irrelevant

Figure 2—Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Automated-control E-banking KRF
Mean
(Standard Deviation)
With
Irrelevant
Information

Without
Irrelevant
Information

Effectiveness

-0.3
(1.27)

0.97
(1.19)

Risk of material misstatement

43.19
(27.54)

57.7
(27.22)

Audit plan adjustments

7.86
(1.32)

8.46
(1.41)

Risk Prediction

Panel B: Manual-process E-banking KRF
Mean
(Standard Deviation)
With
Irrelevant
Information

Without
Irrelevant
Information

Effectiveness

0.76
(1.36)

1.73
(0.93)

Risk of material misstatement

50.41
(31.26)

65.14
(30.56)

Audit plan adjustments

8.11
(1.56)

8.51
(1.82)

Risk Prediction

Response scale:
• Effectiveness: -3 (extremely effective) to +3 (extremely ineffective)
• Risk of material misstatement: Likelihood probabilities between
0 and 100
• A udit plan adjustments: 0 (significantly decrease) to 10 (significantly
increase)
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information was -0.3 and 1.27, respectively. The mean
response and standard deviation of the automated-control
e-banking KRF without irrelevant information was 0.97 and
1.19, respectively. Thus, the participants’ prediction of the
effectiveness of the automated-control e-banking KRF was
almost “neutral” when irrelevant information was present.
In contrast, when irrelevant information was not present,
the participants provided higher risk predictions about the
automated-control e-banking KRF and identified it to be
“somewhat ineffective.”
The mean response and standard deviation of the
participants’ estimates of the risk of material misstatement
of the automated-control e-banking KRF with irrelevant
information was 43.19 and 27.54, respectively. Without
irrelevant information, the mean response and standard
deviation was 57.7 and 27.22, respectively. Thus, the
participants’ estimates of the risk of material misstatement of
the automated-control e-banking KRF were, on average, lower
when irrelevant information was present.
The mean response and standard deviation of the
participants’ adjustments to the audit plan for the automatedcontrol e-banking KRF with irrelevant information was 7.86
and 1.32, respectively. Without irrelevant information, the
mean response and standard deviation was 8.46 and 1.41,
respectively. Thus, the participants’ audit plan adjustments for
the automated-control e-banking KRF were, on average, lower
when irrelevant information was present.
As shown in figure 2, panel B, the mean response
and standard deviation of the participants’ ratings of the
effectiveness of the manual-process e-banking KRF with
irrelevant information was 0.76 and 1.36, respectively. The
mean response and standard deviation of the participants’
ratings of the effectiveness of the manual-process e-banking
KRF without irrelevant information was 1.73 and 0.93,
respectively. Thus, the participants’ predictions of the
effectiveness of the manual-process e-banking KRF were
closer to “somewhat ineffective” when irrelevant information
was present. In contrast, when irrelevant information was
not present, the participants provided higher risk predictions
about the manual-process e-banking KRF by identifying the
KRF to be “ineffective.”
The mean response and standard deviation of the
participants’ estimates of the risk of material misstatement
of the manual-process e-banking KRF with irrelevant
4
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information was 50.41 and 31.26, respectively. The
mean response and standard deviation without irrelevant
information was 65.14 and 30.56, respectively. Thus, the
participants’ estimates of the risk of material misstatement of
the manual-process e-banking KRF were, on average, lower
when irrelevant information was present.
The mean response and standard deviation of the
participants’ adjustments to the audit plan for the manualprocess e-banking KRF with irrelevant information was 8.11
and 1.56, respectively. The mean response and standard
deviation without irrelevant information was 8.51 and 1.82,
respectively. Thus, the participants’ audit plan adjustments for
the manual-process e-banking KRF were, on average, lower
when irrelevant information was present.
The results for the test of the hypotheses are provided in
figure 3. Hypothesis 1 predicts that irrelevant information
will influence IS auditors to reduce their effectiveness ratings
of e-banking KRFs. The results reported in figure 3 suggest
that the influence of irrelevant information is significant for
the effective ratings of e-banking KRFs of automated controls
(panel A, t-statistic = 6.473, p-value < 0.0001) and manual
processes (panel B, t-statistic = 4.705, p-value < 0.0001).
Thus, irrelevant information influences IS auditors to provide
statistically lower effectiveness ratings for automated-control
KRFs and manual-process KRFs.
Hypothesis 2 predicts that irrelevant information will
influence IS auditors to reduce their estimates of the risk
of material misstatement for e-banking KRFs. The results
reported in figure 3 suggest that the influence of irrelevant
information is significant for the risk of material misstatement
estimates of e-banking KRFs for automated controls (panel A,
t = 3.948, p = 0.0002) and manual processes (panel B,
t = 3.787, p < 0.0003). Thus, irrelevant information
influences IS auditors to provide statistically lower estimates
of the risk of material misstatements for automated-control
KRFs and manual-process KRFs.
Hypothesis 3 predicts that irrelevant information will
influence IS auditors to reduce their audit plan adjustments
relative to the prior year’s audit. The results reported in
figure 3 are slightly mixed. Irrelevant information has a
significant influence on IS auditors’ audit plan revisions for
automated-control e-banking KRFs (t = 2.227, p = 0.0161).
However, irrelevant information has only a marginal influence
on IS auditors’ audit plan adjustments for manual-process

Figure 3—Results of Statistical Tests
Influence of Irrelevant Information
KRF: With Irrelevant Information Minus Without Irrelevant Information
Paired Samples Tests, One-tail
Panel A: Automated-control KRF
Risk Prediction

Statistical Degrees of
Freedom (df)

Mean Difference

Standard Deviation

t-statistic

Statistical
Significance (sig.)

Effectiveness

36

-1.27

1.19

6.473

< 0.0001

Risk of material
misstatement

36

-14.51

22.36

3.948

0.0002

Audit plan adjustment

36

-0.60

1.62

2.227

0.0161

Panel B: Manual-process KRF
Risk Prediction

df

Mean Difference

Standard Deviation

t

sig.

Effectiveness

36

-0.97

1.29

4.705

< 0.0001

Risk of material
misstatement

36

-14.73

23.66

3.787

0.0003

Audit plan adjustment

36

-0.41

1.64

1.503

0.0708

e-banking KRFs (t = 1.503, p = 0.0708). Thus, irrelevant
information influences IS auditors to provide statistically lower
audit plan adjustments for automated-control KRFs when
irrelevant information is present. In addition, IS auditors’ plan
adjustments for manual-process KRFs are marginally influenced
by the presence of irrelevant information.
The influence of irrelevant information on human
judgment is widely noted in psychology literature.8 Consistent
with that literature, the results of this study suggest that IS
auditors can be influenced by irrelevant information when
they assess KRFs. However, it may be more beneficial to
identify areas in which the influence of irrelevant information
on IS auditors may be resolved.
Participants’ knowledge, test scores and background
information were analyzed to identify potential areas in which
the influence of irrelevant information on IS auditors could be
mitigated. The participants’ responses were ranked according to
their automated-control knowledge scores, months of longevity
as an IS auditor, and their number of IS audit engagements. For
each of these categories, the participants were partitioned into
one of two groups (high or low) and subjected to nonparametric
statistical tests.9 The additional analysis revealed that IS auditors
with high automated-control knowledge were less influenced
by irrelevant information than IS auditors with low automatedcontrol knowledge. The probabilities that the high and low
automated-control knowledge groups were not similar in their
KRF predictions of effectiveness, risk of material misstatement
and audit plan adjustments were statistically significant (0.009,

0.002 and 0.019, respectively). All of these probabilities are
well below the 0.05 threshold to reject the null hypotheses that
the high and low groups are similar. Thus, a high magnitude of
automated-control knowledge may be what IS auditors need to
overcome the influence of irrelevant information for automatedcontrol KRFs. Neither months of longevity as an IS auditor nor
the number of IS auditor engagements revealed any statistically
significant differences.
The generalizability of the results in this experiment to
other contexts is limited in the same fashion as all experiments
are limited. An experiment cannot capture all facets of the real
world. For example, the IS auditors in this experiment worked
individually to complete the experimental case. IS auditors do
work individually in the real world to assess KRFs, but they
may also collaborate with other IS auditors to assess KRFs.
The influence of irrelevant information on IS audit teams
was not investigated in this study. Moreover, accountability
has not been found to impact the influence of irrelevant
information on financial statement auditors.10 However, the
effects of accountability on IS auditors are unknown and are
was investigated in this study. Therefore, IS auditors may not
be affected by irrelevant information when they collaborate
with other IS auditors or when they are accountable to
another member of the audit engagement team.
CONCLUSION
The results in figure 3 indicate that irrelevant information
influences the KRF predictions of IS auditors. The psychological
ISACA JOURNAL VOLUME 4, 2011
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literature on the influence of irrelevant information suggests that
the presence of irrelevant information reduces the prediction
of future outcomes.11 If IS auditors reduce their assessments of
KRFs as a result of their exposure to irrelevant information, too
few resources may be allocated to the evaluation of KRFs during
financial statement audits. Subsequently, and most important,
audit failure could occur.
The practical implication of this study is that IS auditors
with high automated-control knowledge may be able to
mitigate potential audit failure that occurs as a result of their
exposure to irrelevant information. IS auditors with high
knowledge scores in automated controls were not influenced
by irrelevant information as much as IS auditors with low
knowledge scores in automated controls.
Knowledge can be defined as the “fact or condition of
being aware of something.”12 Thus, IS auditors may be able
to minimize the effects of irrelevant information by increasing
their awareness of the information that they will encounter
when they assess KRFs. This means that IS auditors could
increase their awareness of their clients’ information
environments by reading their clients’ prior-period work
papers, if they exist. If prior-period work papers do not exist,
IS auditors should interview their clients to increase their
awareness of their clients’ information environments. If clients
are not willing to discuss their information environments,
IS auditors should perform a self-study and form their own
expectations of the clients’ information environments.
After having an idea of what to expect in a client’s
information environment, IS auditors should examine the step
in the audit plan prior to performing that step. Next, the IS
auditor should reconcile the step in the audit plan with the
relevant information that the IS auditor plans to encounter.
Last, IS auditors should ignore the information that is of little
or no value to completing the step in the audit plan, while
focusing on information that is relevant to completing the
audit step.
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